The first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-1842 sets the stage for this examination of Shah Shuja, and the large volume of literature on the war itself requires attention before we can turn to the Afghan monarch who is most intimately associated with the catastrophic colonial failure in Pashtun dominated Afghanistan. The first Anglo-Afghan war is well documented yet poorly understood. It is well documented from the diplomatic and military perspectives, but questions still remain about what is generally viewed as the most consequential defeat suffered by colonial forces in the history of the British Empire.
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Sir John William Kaye (1854) produced the first substantive treatment of the Afghan disaster and he located blame with the Governor General Lord Auckland and his circle of advisors. Subsequent authorities on the subject have in various ways exonerated Auckland (Norris 1967 ) and focused more attention on Alexander Burnes and the Political Agency System he represents (Yapp 1962 (Yapp , 1963 (Yapp , 1964 (Yapp , 1980 . Some writers have drawn attention to the failure of the colonial communication networks in their own right and in relation to indigenous forms of information circulation (Bayly 1996 : 128-140, Iqbal 1975 , others point to Anglo-Sikh relations (Hasrat 1959 (Hasrat , 1968 , while still others have drawn attention to the failure of supply lines (McMunn 1977: 125) . There are multiple first-hand accounts by British Indian soldiers and administrators that provide extensive information about the constitution of military units, routing and transportation issues, and the multiple battles that occurred at various stages of the war (Gould & Chadwick 1880 , Greenwood 1844 , Gupta 1987 , Haughton 1879 , Stocqueler 1983 . Students also benefit from considerable literature on the fateful final march of Army of the Indus from the Kabul cantonments through its destruction at Jagdalak and final demise at Gandamak (de Wend 1915 , L. Dupree 1976 , Macrory 1966 . One also finds a good deal of attention to the Company Surgeon Dr. William Brydon who was the sole survivor of that fateful march (Trousdale 1983) , and the plight of British captives including Lady Sale in Bamiyan (Sale 2002) , as well as the siege of Jalalabad and its defense by General Robert Sale (N. Dupree 1975a , 1975b , Trousdale 1983 ). We have a large volume of writings about the British Army of Retribution led by Sir George Pollock wherein the contributions of Robert Sale and Sir William Nott (Kekewich 2011 , Nott & Stocqueler 1854 are prominent. There is a postal history of the war (Martin 1964 ) and biographies from a number of participants, including the American Quaker Josiah Harlan (Macintyre 2005) .
3
In addition to the multiple general historical analyses (Durand 2000 , Forbes 1892 : 1-157, Hay 1911 , Morris 1878 , the war was reintroduced in the United Kingdom in 1969 through the historical fiction genre with George Macdonald Fraser's Flashman novel that became the first in a popular twelve-volume series (Fraser 2005) . Roughly thirty years later in the United States John Waller's (1990) Beyond the Khyber also garnered a good deal of notoriety. The first Anglo-Afghan war received heightened attention after 11 September 2011 with a large number of American and British academics, policy makers, journalists, amateur historians, and web-based writers and cartographers generating another rich layer of information about this important conflict (Andovski 2010 , Fremont-Barnes 2009 , Johnson 2011 , Loyn 2009 , O'Ballance 2002 : 1-28, Tanner 2002 .
4
Looking at these rich and diverse fields of literature on the first Anglo-Afghan war it is clear the conflict has been revisited by a large number of writers in each country involved in subsequent conflicts. Each cycle of writings appears to largely reproduce and repackage without substantial alteration a master historical narrative superimposed over the abysmal loss of the Army of the Indus that jeopardized the fiscal buoyancy of British East India Company rule in India and triggered events leading to the Great Indian Mutiny in 1857. 2 The master narrative can be outlined as follows. British geo-political concerns with Russian imperial ambitions led to an ill-advised and poorly executed extension of British military power in the Hindu Kush in the summer of 1839. The poorly conceived occupation met its almost predictable end due to the treachery of the erstwhile Afghan ally, Akbar Khan, and the unexpected assassinations of its key leaders, William Macnaghten and Alexander Burnes, in November of 1841. In January of 1842 the occupation army, deprived of regular supplies and under the incompetent leadership of William Elphinstone, took the disastrous decision to escape Kabul and was massacred en route to Jalalabad. A version of that narrative appears in all English language writings, and among the most prominent common denominators within the first Anglo-Afghan war literature is the attention given to the circulating Durrani monarchs Shah Shuja (r. 1803-1809 and 1839-1842) and Dost Muhammad (r. 1826 Muhammad (r. -1839 Muhammad (r. and 1842 Muhammad (r. -1863 . Shuja is the Afghan ruler who in 1809 received the first British emissary to the Kabul Kingdom, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and who thirty years later in 1839 was repatriated by the Army of the Indus and then met his fate with it. Dost Muhammad is the Afghan ruler who surrendered to the British at the beginning of the war and returned to power after it was over. Just as the master narrative of the first Anglo-Afghan war tends to elide its significant long-term economic impact on the Afghan economy, the master narrative of modern Afghanistan as a whole is woven around the theme of Pashtun domination. 13 Without the space here to survey all of the literature on modern Afghanistan, it would be very difficult to argue the prominent theme of Pashtun domination of Afghanistan does not unify large, diverse, and growing sets of writings on the country. The most fundamental problem with the predicate of Pashtun domination of Afghanistan is that it is not explained beyond reference to tribal genealogies that, in keeping with short order thinking about the country and its people, are not interrogated as either historical texts or frameworks for political action. In this hasty reasoning manner Shah Shuja is accepted as a Pashtun because he is the grandson of the founder of the Afghan state Ahmad Shah who is portrayed as a Pashtun, but again conspicuously not demonstrated to be one.
14 Mutatis mutandis Dost Mohammad becomes merely a 'rival cousin' who steps back into a stable framework of Pashtun domination of the Afghan state after the Shuja's demise. So the master narrative of Pashtun domination imposes a view of the multiple reigns of Shah Shuja and Dost Mohammad and of the first Anglo-Afghan war more generally as simply a slight shift between from the Popalzai Saddozay tribal lineage to the Barakzai Muhammadzai genealogical branch of Pashtuns who continued to dominate the Afghan state structure until the Revolution of 1978. Even through the transformative convulsions of invasions and war characterizing the last thirty plus years, the master narrative still dictates that Afghanistan be seen as a problem resulting from violent conflict inherent among Pashtun communities who are by nature hostile to other local tribal and ethnic groups congenitally predisposed to reject democracy, development and modernity.
10 It is very hard to follow the logic of how Pashtuns, who are allegedly unable to organize themselves at the state level, can use that very 'failed state' in Afghanistan to dominate anything, let alone other Pashtuns who are said, often in the same breath, to be indomitable. For present purposes, without detailing all of the problematic aspects and unsustainable tenets of the Pashtun domination thesis, it must be emphasized that it requires its consumers to fundamentally suspend their consideration of the realities of internal diversity among Pashtun, the many kinds and degrees of exposures Pashtuns have to non-Pashtuns and the outer non-Pashtun world, as well as the powerful influence of the Persian language on Pashtuns and in the Afghan state structure. 15 The 16 Elphinstone's mission was composed of at least 13 additional British officers, 4000 (combined) infantry and cavalry troops, 600 camels, 13 elephants and in total as a single column stretched nearly two miles. 17 Elphinstone and his large retinue left Delhi in October or November of 1808 and in February 1809 arrived in Peshawar, a city Shuja considered the winter capital of his Kabul Kingdom. The most harrowing episode on the nearly four-month and 500-mile long journey was the near demise of the mission due to lack of water in the Rajasthan desert. Elphinstone achieved the goal of a BEIC treaty with the ruler of Kabul. He and Shuja signed a treaty the very day the mission departed from Peshawar, 14 April 1809. The treaty was ratified by Lord Minto on 14 June. 18 13 Elphinstone's diplomatic and scientific caravan returned to Delhi in September 1809 and was disbanded in June 1810, the interim period being dedicated to preparation of the mission's final report. 19 Portions of the report were published in 1815 in a book form as An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul that was twice reprinted in 1839 and 1842 for military and public reference in the context of the first Anglo-Afghan war. Elphinstone and his delegation were charged with producing an original and encyclopaedic reference work about the Kingdom of Kabul and its dependencies through their own scientific research. In large measure the scientific investigations performed by the British officers including Elphinstone were predicated on harvesting information from local informants, some of whom such as a nephew of Sayyid Muhin Shah were paid a 'handful of money for answering a few questions' while others were commissioned to undertake more elaborate ethnographic inquiries, for example Rs. 50 per month to one Mulla Najib contracted to gather linguistic and other data about the Siah Posh communities in Kafiristan. 20 Although it is unclear precisely who and to what extent others beyond Elphinstone 26 This prompted a flurry of colonial communications in anticipation of her arrival in British India. The BEIC concluded that despite the 'inconvenience, embarrassment, distaste, disutility, expense and regret' of an 'unavoidable scenario' her 'rank and calamities' would ultimately dictate 'granting her asylum, dignity and respect.' 27 At this time the British were not considering a permanent pension or provisions for Wafa Begum and wanted it made crystal clear to 'her and any other females' that while in British India they can give absolutely no 'aid or protection to any male branches of the family or any of the numerous dependents and followers.' 28 It is noteworthy that to convey their intended messages the British used direct written and oral communications with Wafa Begum as well as local newspapers in Lahore (at least) to publicly broadcast their position regarding displaced Kabul royalty. 29 19 By the summer of 1813 Ranjit Singh had taken possession of Shuja the person and, apparently of more importance to the Maharaja, the famous Koh-i Nur diamond Elpinstone saw adorning the former Kabul ruler's elbow bracelet. 30 The BEIC believed Shuja would soon be released and that both he and 'his queen' would make their way to British India. The British had been expecting to receive Wafa Begum for years and colonial authorities were prepared to tolerate her presence in their territory, but they were increasingly adamant that all possible steps be taken directly and through intermediaries to 'dissuade, discourage and resist' Shuja's presence that would be 'infinitely more troubling' than his wife's. 31 The inevitable negotiations with both Shuja and Wafa Begum required 'all the talents and reserves' of the BEIC Resident in Delhi, who was then the aforementioned Charles Metcalfe, with David Ochterlony assuming the post subsequently. 20 Ochterlony was positioned in and around Ludhiana and Karnaul that were two likely destinations of asylum-seeking Afghan elites given the precedents of the Afghan monarch Shah Zaman (1770-1844). Zaman reigned in Kabul between 1793 and 1800 when he was deposed and blinded by Mahmoud. Zaman appears to be the first Afghan elite to be granted a British pension in Ludhiana in 1801. 32 Elphinstone met him when returning from Peshawar and encountering Shuja's speeding harem at Hassan Abdal in 1809 (see above). Zaman, Mahmoud and Shuja were all half-brothers sharing as their father Timur Shah (r. 1773-1793) who was the son and successor of the Afghan empire's founder, namely, Ahmad Shah (r. 1747-1773). 21 Ahmad Shah was born in Multan in 1722 and in the spring of 1815 Wafa Begum was petitioning the British to leverage Ranjit for the release of Shuja so that they two could be reunited there in what might have been viewed as an ancestral homeland among many homelands. 33 Records indicate the primary British concern was how various potentialities of receiving Shuja and his household at any location or communicating with him in any formal capacity would impact the BEIC relationship with the emerging Sikh empire of Ranjit Singh. The mutual defense treaty Charles Metcalfe failed to secure was likely a primary source of this institutional preoccupation. That conjecture notwithstanding, in August 1815 the BEIC rendered it prudent to grant Wafa Begum a pension of Rs. 1,500 per month. 34 22 What exactly transpired over the next year is unclear, but in September 1816 the British decided to grant Shuja an annual pension of Rs. 50,000. 35 This figure was inclusive of all previous arrangements with his dependents including Wafa Begum and remained valid while he and his household remained under British jurisdiction. When Lieutenant Murray was sent to convey the terms of this pension to Shuja in October he reported that the exKing of Kabul 'who spoke good but soft and low Persian…considered himself at home' with those arrangements. 36 Murray provided details about the precise statements, spatial movements, physical gestures, and material exchanges comprising this encounter. In Murray's descriptions the heavily influential role of Shuja's Persian-speaking 'confidante and preceptor' Mullah Shakur Ishakzai is most noticeable. As the wazir-e azam or chief minister and the usual go-between for Shuja in written and oral communications with his British patrons, his wife Wafa Begum, his onetime captor and would-be ally Ranjit Singh, Hindu bankers from Shikarpur, and the Sind Amirs, Mullah Shakur was clearly the most influential member of Shuja's small inner circle of confidantes.
23 Between November 1816 and July 1817 Murray and Mullah Shakur communicated and interacted extensively. 37 Murray was stationed in Ludhiana and his duties appear to revolve exclusively around the pensioned ex-king. The day after his first introduction Murray received written requests from Mullah Shakur regarding Shuja's desired appropriation of one of three residences already occupied by British officers in the vicinity of Wafa Begum's recently acquired domicile. Communication ensued about those three and additional possible residences for Shuja alone, alternative homes for both Shuja and Wafa Begum, and about the technical prospects and estimated costs of potentially closing public roads to make private passages between separate residences. From records examined in Lahore it is unclear precisely where Shuja and Wafa were finally situated, or if one or both of them ever changed or shared residences while in Ludhiana. What is clear is that privacy was a primary concern of Shuja's, and Mullah Shakur repeatedly complained to Murray about that value being compromised by passersby mounted on elephants. 38 
24
The concentration of records for the approximate eight-month period after Shuja was granted his pension reveal features of communicative practice on each side of this asymmetrical relationship. From the British Indian vantage point it was essential to disassociate themselves from their client's expressed aspirations to recover the Kabul throne. 39 But of course this particular position with reference to Shuja was destabilized by the British pension that entailed a number of widely publicly known components of their material support beyond the mere physical location of complimentary and complementary residences. To help sooth the tension between the theory and practice of their policy toward Shuja, Murray was instructed to disseminate official positions and refutations of 'bazaar rumor' via local news writers, their publications and the conversations those texts produced. 25 Some of the challenges the British had with reference to Shuja came from the ousted dynast's own camp which tried to generate a robust public rendition of colonial patronage via its own networks of local communication that were never fully captured by British. In this information battle Mullah Shakur was repeatedly chastised by Murray for a number of communicative missteps and oversteps. One of the issues of contention was the circulation of alleged forgeries of correspondence between Shuja's zenana and the British that jeopardized the pension itself. 40 This episode reveals targeted messaging and disinformation campaigns waged between Shuja and the British were triangulated Shah Shuja's 'Hidden History' and its Implications for the Historiography of ... South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal , Free-Standing Articles through the relatively independent agencies of Wafa Begum personally and the zenana generally. 26 Armed horsemen comprise the final principal subject area addressed in the cache of archival documents generated in the months following the implementation of Shuja's pension. The British characterized the approximate 4,000 horsemen in Shuja's entourage as 'unfortunate, presumptuous, and rapacious' and note it was legal for them to be carrying away Shuja's property in lieu of pay while migrating to an alternative center of Afghan political gravity in Karnaul. 41 To replace this growing deficit among his retainer corps Shuja tried with little success to hire the 'Hindustani' horsemen he was fond of hunting with in daylight hours for night-time watch duty. 42 The hiring of non-Afghan Hindustani military labor was contentious because of Shuja's declared intention to recapture what he termed wilayat with the support of the wilayatis who still remained loyal to him. 43 The point of friction was that Shuja had only the pension as income and the pension itself could not be used for purposes at odds with official British policy that in this case was not to support his desire to recapture Kabul. The issues relating to Shuja's armed retainers were amplified by discrepancies in the amounts and modes of payment of the pension. These quandaries were particularly acute during the early transition months after Shuja was deemed to receive Rs. 50,000 annually which as noted subsumed Wafa Begum's previously granted Rs. 1,500 monthly pension. 44 
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The cumulative impact these issues entailed for his emerging relationship with the British apparently depressed Shuja to the extent that he expressed a desire to visit the ziarat or shrine of his spiritual ancestor, the Naqshbandi Sufi Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (c. 1564-1624), known as the mujaddid-i alf-i thani or the Renewer of the Second Millennium. 45 Murray discouraged this request for spiritual relief that in symbolic terms at least would have made the pension appear more like a prison to Shuja.
Shuja's failed attempt to recapture Kabul, household defections and education, 1832-1836 28 The second bundle of archival material for Shuja is from the 1830s and contextualized by the BEIC desire to 'open up the Indus River for commercial navigation […] just as Alexander had planned two millennia ago.' 46 The colonial plan for the Indus culminated in the Army of the Indus that ultimately evaporated on retreat from Kabul in January 1842. The Indus Navigation Project represented and underwrote the Army of the Indus. 47 The Indus Navigation Project was informed by a scientific understanding of dyadic fiscal, physical and temporal relations between the markets of Kabul in the Hindu Kush and the hypothesized but never realized port market of Mithenkote that was to be situated near the conflux of the five rivers of the Punjab. The Indus Navigation Project was predicated on an over-confidence in the prospects of modern technology to surmount nature by dredging the Indus and eliminating its floods, thus allowing for the construction of an inland port at Mithenkote that could be serviced by specially configured flat-bottomed steamships from Europe on the one hand and Afghan nomadic traders and their camels routed from Kabul on the other. 48 To be realized the Indus Navigation Project required the cooperation of Ranjit Singh and a compliant ruler in Kabul, thus the collusion between Ranjit, Shuja and the British in the Tripartite Treaty of 1839 sanctioning the formation and actions of the ill-fated Indus Army that is the normative historiographic focus of the first Anglo-Afghan war. 49 What is of interest here is Shuja's earlier similarly unsuccessful attempt to re-capture Kabul made between 1832-34 without overt public political endorsement or military support from the BEIC. 50 29 Even before his British pension began in 1816 Shuja wrote multiple letters to Elphinstone to seek assistance in reclaiming Kabul. 51 Toward that end during the 1820s Shuja continued writing to lobby his cause with Elphinstone and increasingly influential colonial officials, ever more residual Mughal elites, and his former captor Ranjit Singh. By the early 1830s the BEIC had begun to survey the Indus and to calibrate the colonial commercial and political agenda around Kabul in opposition to Russian imperial expansion in Central Asia. It is important to note the chronological overlap between the Indus Navigation Project and colonial fantasizing about Mithkenkote on the one hand and Shuja's first failed attempt to re-conquer Kabul on the other. After considerable effort Shuja was able to gain a four-month advance on his monthly pension from the BEIC and in early 1832 he set out from Ludhiana for Kabul via the southern Shikarpur-Qandahar route. 52 Most of the northerly trajectory from Ludhiana to Kabul via the Punjab and Peshawar was under the control of Ranjit Singh. Shuja and Ranjit had reached a 'pincer movement' agreement against the reigning Amir of Kabul, Dost Mohammad, with Shuja to reclaim his old throne in Kabul and Ranjit to take Peshawar. The BEIC sanctioned this plan, however informally or surreptitiously, through at least the lack of opposition to it. 53 30 Shuja's expedition expected but ultimately failed to generate momentum in fiscal and physical terms as it moved from Ludhiana toward Kabul. 54 The keys to being able to pay for the mobile and growing army necessary to capture Kabul were to secure the financial hub of Shikarpur and the support of Shikarpuri financiers, in either chronological order. Shuja encountered financial difficulties soon after leaving Ludhiana. To pay for his troops and their various support personnel including craftsmen and merchants before reaching Shikarpur Shuja had to mortgage some of his property and borrow against his British pension from Indian bankers that accompanied his army. 55 Despite these financial challenges Shuja managed to retain his European advisors and at this still formative stage in early 1833 his army and intentions were consequential enough to generate correspondence with Dost Mohammad and his brothers who served as vice regents in Peshawar and Qandahar. 56 Shikarpur had been vacated and his troops occupied a financial center emptied of treasure, but by seizing the city Shuja appears to have increased his threat level in the eyes of Dost Mohammad who wrote to him in May in somewhat conciliatory terms offering a son as a hostage and a reinstatement of some of Shuja's former titles and privileges if the expedition were terminated. 31 This letter had no effect on his plans and Shuja's army left Shikarpur for Qandahar via Sind in early 1834. During this movement Shuja resolved tension with the Sind Amirs resulting from his extortion of an untold amount of rupees from the financiers of Shikarpur who eventually repopulated the city. Shuja captured Qandahar in March 1834. 58 The occupation of Qandahar was quite brief, despite a large body of Dost Mohammad's forces dispatched to relieve Shuja's siege of the Qandahar citadel having been redirected toward Peshawar after that city was taken by the forces of Ranjit Singh. The increasing number of defections among Shuja's forces during the siege of the citadel led to the disbandment of his consistently fiscally tenuous expedition. With his plans rapidly unraveling Shuja feigned an escape to Herat only to make a return to his safe haven in Ludhiana through the still relatively friendly terrain controlled by the Amirs of Sind. their services to him but were rejected and then absconded leaving a Rs. 500 debt to the bankers in his camp. 59 The still ex-King of Kabul appears to have ended his reconquest expedition in the summer of 1834 with the mortgaging of personal property that mirrors how the unsuccessful foray began nearly two and a half years earlier. The mortgaging incident that occurred on return to Ludhiana involved the disappearance of the finance minister Shuja employed on this expedition, the Shikarpuri Hindu Lala Jeth Mal, who was said to be in unwarranted possession of property valued at Rs. 50,000 being held as loan collateral. 60 Correspondence with the Sind Amirs and BEIC officials including Elphinstone directly, indirectly through Mulla Shakur, and via letters delivered by runners led to the return of the goods in question that included an illuminated Quran, a jeweled battle axe and a telescope. In these communications that lasted until at least the summer of 1835 Shuja and Mulla Shakur tried to emphasize the expedition was not defeated by its opposition, but rather failed merely for want of money. 61 In terms of cost it was noted that sieges such as that in Qandahar are particularly expensive and that Shuja's army required one lakh or Rs. 1,00,000 per month to be properly maintained. 33 Shuja's defeat had a number of important and arguably predictable ramifications on his household affairs in Ludhiana. These include apparent defections of important members of his family, most notably his eldest son Timur on more than one occasion. In December 1835 Timur entered British records for being abandoned by his servants on one of his escapes, and then managing to borrow money that he could not repay against his father's pension. 62 34 Archival reference to schools and education during the 1830s are most consequential for us because they speak to planning for a prolonged stay of Afghan elite pensioners and their dependents in Ludhiana and elsewhere in British India. Both pensioned former Shah's of Kabul, namely Zaman and Shuja, established schools for their dependents. Zaman established a school with a combined Arabic and Persian curriculum and Shuja a school that operated only on the Persian model. In approximately July 1836 the pensioners began to petition the British for more funds to purchase books or for gratis texts for these schools. It is unclear from the materials consulted precisely when schools sprung up within the Afghan community in Ludhiana, but by the summer of 1836 there were approximately 3000 school age males enrolled in Zaman's and Shuja's schools. 63 35 Schools run by Afghans in Ludhiana must be seen in relation to the schools run by the British in that city and elsewhere. The school organized under the direction of the influential political agent in Ludhiana, Claude Wade, had in 1834 attracted the attention of a key local intelligence provider and logistical ally in Kabul for the British, Nawab Jabar Khan who was an elder half-brother of Dost Mohammad. Nawab Jabar Khan had to arrange for the secret escape of his son Abd al-Ghias Khan out of Kabul to attend Wade's school in Ludhiana. Once there, Abd al-Ghias received a monthly British scholarship/ pension of Rs. 100 per month. This was apparently insufficient and just like Shuja's son Timur so too did Abd al-Ghias run away and accrue large debts on the open market. 64 For colonial officials these actions only served to complicate the presence of their Afghan clients in British India. 36 Full attention to competing schools and the politics of education more broadly among Afghan refugees, exiles and pensioners in British India is beyond the scope this paper. The subject of education nevertheless is a reminder that we are discussing a community of Afghans composed primarily of exiled and pensioned former elites that numbered in the multiple thousands in Ludhiana in the 1830s. Conclusion: unlearning and relearning Afghanistan through Shah Shuja 37 The variety and constancy of migrations between Afghanistan and India is an important historical theme evinced by Shah Shuja's biography. The patterns of migration between Afghanistan and India vary by theme (e.g., secular or religious learning, commerce, politics), through multiple historical areas (e.g., pre-Islamic, early Islamic, Mughal, colonial) and across different cultural and spatial geographies and circuitries (e.g., Bamian-Gandhara, Ghazni-Lahore, Kabul-Delhi, Qandahar-Karachi). During Shuja's lifespan the lucrative provinces of Sind, the Punjab and Kashmir fell away from Kabul's sway and rival centers of political gravity such as Herat, Peshawar and Qandahar exerted independence from the emerging tenuously singular state capital of Kabul. Shuja's biography represents the last gasp of mobile kingship and thus the end of the Afghan empire and, simultaneously, the determining influence of colonialism on the historical profile of the increasingly Kabul-centered Afghan state. While Shuja therefore helps us see that colonialism transformed patterns of migration between Afghanistan and India in general terms, his case highlight a conspicuous larger pattern of circular migration among political elites that will be considered below. First, however, we need to consider how the master narratives of the first Anglo-Afghan war and Afghanistan more generally fail to help us understand Shah Shuja's biography. 38 As indicated in the introduction to this essay, the master narrative of the first AngloAfghan war follows a military timeline that de-emphasizes the less dramatic economic, intellectual and cultural exchanges that occur beneath and around the chronologies of coercion that are supplied in overabundance to new generations of would-be-conquerors of Afghanistan and students of failed colonial conquests. The master historical narrative of Afghanistan that took shape during the colonial era has been transferred into Afghan nationalist historiography. From the perspective of stakeholders in that totalizing vision of Afghanistan, this distillation of archival records about Shuja's pension in Ludhiana might be seen as 'airing dirty laundry' about the exceptional experiences of a unique ruler whose aberrant over-dependency on the British ultimately cost him his life. After all, those addicted and confined to the master narrative would say, the bloody end of Shuja's second tenure represents the 'real history' of eternally xenophobic Pashtun tribal resistance to imperial aggression of one sort or another that has been occurring for millennia. 39 What is strikingly ironic about the rich colonial archival database on Shuja that one would expect to support the master narrative of Pashtun dominance of Afghanistan is that it does the opposite. There are a number of criteria available for evaluating Pashtun identity, speaking Pashto (Pashto wayal) and the behavioral exhibition of core values ( Pashtunwali) in 'doing Pashto' (Pashto kawal) being at once ordinary and primary features of Pashtun identity. Nowhere in the hundreds of files on Shuja, scores of which are cited here, is there any reference to the peripatetic king speaking Pashto or practicing Pashtunwali. A researcher can look in vain for evidence of Pashtun identity or Pashtun tribal connections in the thousands of pages providing extremely minute detail on, for example, patterns of speech and domestic arrangements. In terms of verbal conduct, it is clear that Shuja was a monoglot Persian speaker and did not know Pashto or display any need or desire to engage the Pashto language, or any other language for that matter. In terms of the exhibition of the core values of Pashtunwali, far from practicing badal or anything resembling blood revenge, for example against his captor Ranjit Singh who carted him around in a cage and dispossessed him of the famous Koh-e Nur diamond, Shuja appears interested in forgetting the past, and making an alliance with Ranjit Singh to continue with that example of a lack of vengeance for being publicly dishonored. Instead of practicing purdah or female seclusion, Shuja put his wife Wafa Begum metaphorically and literally ahead of himself in relation to the wider public that was not limited to just British colonial officials. Another primary contradiction between the master narrative of Pashtun domination and Shuja's lived experience was that he was unable to offer melmastia or hospitality of his own, and instead had to accept nanawati or asylum from the British! Perhaps the most basic problem is that Pashto and Pashtuns are grounded in rural zone, while Shuja's predilection was for the urban life. 40 The imposition of what Edward Said (1994) helps us identify as a highly Orientalized prepackaged master narrative about Pashtun identity and Pashtun domination do not help us understand Shah Shuja and his place in Afghan history, rather, those faulty templates distort the historical realities of his cultural profile and the cultural complexity of the country-at-large. Following Said's general cultural critique while offering a specific conceptual remedy to the prevailing Orientalist mystification of Pashtuns and Afghanistan, I suggest an inversion of the ordinary analytics that impose a Pashtunization agenda on Shuja and the Afghan state elites he represents. As an alternative to existing models of tribalism, ethnicity and/or nationalism among Pashtuns, the concept of migration provides a much more appropriate mechanism for drawing larger meanings from the ample concrete data we have about Shuja's biography. The argument for a revisionist approach to Shah Shuja specifically and Afghan historiography more generally is essentially advocating a data-first methodological approach to the subject matter. Once intellectually liberated from the politically addictive qualities of a hyper-ethnicized and militarized master narrative, Shuja does not appear as the exceptional dynast whose dependencies were clearly out of line with the normative but awkward understanding of perpetual Pashtun rule in Kabul. Instead, Shuja's external dependency becomes the most characteristic feature of the Afghan political system. Shuja's and other Afghan elites' resource dependency sustained a pattern of circular migration that requires brief attention.
41 A cursory review of Afghanistan's history beginning with its founder Ahmad Shah through to the present Hamid Karzai will indicate that a high level of dependency on external resources is a primary characteristic of Afghan political elites and the regimes they form. The basic pattern is as follows: rulers take local power in relation to external resources; this prompts the voluntary or forced migration of local political opponents; many of those opponents receive refuge and asylum from the (same) external powers that routinely provide resources to exiles and refugees; the collusion of interests between powerful 'host' external actors wanting to advance their peripheral interests and the deracinated dependent ex-elite 'guests' hopeful of regaining their former status in Kabul with external support is realized; the cyclical pattern is repeated. 42 This migration-based model of Afghan history is predicated on circulation and the continual relationship between internal and external processes that form the Afghan political system. The circular migration model does not fit every Afghan ruler and each historical era perfectly, but it carries the weight of much evidence. The model is particularly useful for helping to explain how Afghan elites such as Shuja and his household were exposed to colonial frameworks of understanding and acting on Afghanistan while in 'diaspora,' during which time they received education, training and incentives to transfer colonial practices and frames of reference 'back' to Afghanistan when 'repatriated.' The Afghan national reproduction of colonial ideologies through the conduit of circulating political elites requires separate treatment, here Shuja only illuminates the historical pattern to be explored elsewhere. 
Figure 3:
Jugdelluk, the last stand made by General Elphinstone's army in the calamitous retreat. This lithograph was taken from plate 21 of 'Afghaunistan' by Lieutenant James Rattray.
The British army suffered its worst disaster while retreating from Kabul in January 1842. On 6 January, the British force of 4,500 soldiers and about 12,000 followers under Major-General Elphinstone pulled out of Kabul and left for Jallalabad. They had been guaranteed safe passage by 18 tribal leaders, but fell prey to the extreme cold, lack of food and supplies and attacks from higher ground by local tribesmen. The column suffered terrible losses and upon reaching Gandamak near the Jagdalak Pass the survivors made a last stand, only to be massacred in a final ambush on 12 January. A single European survivor, Dr William Brydon, managed to reach Jalalabad the following day. Rattray himself rode through the pass in October 1842, as part of Nott's rear-guard. The pass rises in steep ascent; between its walls of blackened granite remnants of barricades still stood, interlaced with bones. Piles of mummified bodies and whitening bones were everywhere. Rattray, depressed that none had the time to perform a decent burial, wrote:
'we were led on by our skeleton guides from mountain to deep ravine, over valley and rugged cliff, skeletons for landmarks, for direction posts, skeletons.' 
